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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court poured-over this case to the Utah 
Court of Appeals for disposition on August 7, 1997. The Utah 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(g). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 
78-2a-3(2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in its conclusions that there was no 
verbal agreement between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants? 
Standard of review is subject to the correction of error 
standard. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, Inc. 834 P. 2d 
582 (Utah App. 1992)(whether a contract exists between parties). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules 
are determinative in this appeal or are of central importance to 
this appeal. 
S 25-5-3, U.C.A. (1953) 
"Every contract for the ... sale, of any lands, or interest 
in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the . . . sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing." 
§ 25-5-8, U.C.A. (1953) 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of agreements in case of part performance 
thereof." §25-5-8, U.C.A. (1953) as amended. 
S 57-12-7(1), U.C.A. (1953) 
"(1) No person shall be required to move or be 
relocated from land used as his residence and acquired under 
any of the condemnation or eminent domain laws of this state 
until he has been offered a comparable replacement dwelling 
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which is a decent, safe, clean, and sanitary dwelling 
adequate to accommodate this person, reasonably accessible 
to public services and places of employment, and available 
on the private market. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiffs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer of 
real property based upon Defendants unwillingness to pay an 
increase in rent on November 1, 1996. The Defendants filed a 
counter-claim asserting an interest as purchasers in the real 
property pursuant to a verbal contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On March 11, 1997, the Plaintiffs served upon the Defendants 
a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit and Notice of Termination of 
Month-to-Month Tenancy. On March 24, 1997, the Defendants were 
served with a 3-Day Summons and an Eviction Complaint. 
Defendants responded on March 26, 1997 to Plaintiff's Eviction 
Complaint when they filed their Answer and asserted a Counter-
claim. On March 31, 1997, the Plaintiffs sought a possession 
bond which the court ultimately set at $1,500.00. On April 4, 
1997, the Plaintiffs replied to the Defendants1 Counter-claim. 
On this same day, Plaintiffs mailed the Notice of Plaintiffs1 
possession bond to the Defendants with such Notice reflecting 
that the possession bond had been filed with the Court on April 
3, 1997. On April 9, 1997, the Defendants objected to the manner 
of service of the notice of the setting of a possession bond and 
demanded a hearing. On April 14, 1997, the trial court, instead 
of addressing the setting of the possession bond, conducted a 
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hearing to determine whether the property in question was rental 
property or not. At this hearing, all parties involved were 
subject to direct, cross, and redirect examination. Because of 
time constraints, the hearing was continued to April 22, 1997. 
At the conclusion of testimony on April 22, 1997, the trial court 
requested memorandums from both parties to address certain 
questions. Specifically, the trial court asked the following 
questions to be addressed: 
(1) Whether a verbal agreement to purchase is enforceable 
under the statute of frauds;. 
(2) What evidence of partial performance had been submitted 
to the trial court; 
(3) If an agreement to purchase existed, when were the 
Defendants required to exercise their option; 
(4) Whether the Defendants breached the agreement by 
failing to purchase the property within one year of 
possession; and 
(5) What, if any, where Plaintiffs1 remedies for breach of 
the agreement by the Defendants. 
In concluding the hearing on April 22, 1997, the trial court 
expressed that it would issue its judgment on May 20, 1997 at 
11:00 a.m. based on the merits after reviewing the parties 
Memorandums. On May 20, 1997, the trial court disposed of the 
case as indicated below. On May 29, 1997, the Defendants 
requested, by ex parte motion, a stay of the order and judgment. 
On May 29, 1997, the Defendants filed their notice of appeal. On 
June 3, 1997, the trial court published its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as well as its final Order and Judgment. 
C. Disposition of the Case 
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The Plaintiffs were granted judgment for possession and 
restitution of the property as of midnight on May 31, 1997 with 
the Defendants being ordered to vacate the property by that same 
time and date. The trial court terminated the month-to-month 
lease and declared that any verbal option to purchase the 
property which may have been given had expired. The trial court 
also quieted title to the Plaintiffs by declaring that the 
Defendants had no further rights or interest in the property. 
The trial court granted judgment against the Defendants, jointly 
and severally, in the amount of $217.80 for unpaid rent and 
$224.00 for Plaintiff's court costs as well as reserving the 
issues of waste and damages for further determination. The 
Plaintiffs' possession bond was ordered to be returned to the 
Plaintiffs and the trial court ordered that the Plaintiffs were 
entitled to recover any after-accruing costs associated with the 
eviction and any additional rent accruing after May 31, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts recited herein are taken 
from the transcripts of April 12, 1997 and April 22, 1997, 
hearings as well as the Exhibits introduced thereat. 
Mr. Figueroa was notified in writing letter on June 8, 1987, 
by the Salt Lake City Airport Authority that he and his family 
would have to relocate because the Airport Authority would be 
acquiring their residence. At this time, the Airport Authorities 
indicated to Mr. Figueroa that he would receive either $3,752 for 
if he moved to a rental or $4,500 if he purchased a home rather 
than choosing a replacement rental. He was given until July 10, 
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1987 to inform the Salt Lake City Airport Authority as to which 
option he wished to exercise. (Def. Exhibit No. 6) 
During July of 1987, Mr. Figueroa contacted Mr. Armijo about 
renting the property in question. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 6). Mr. Armijo 
indicated to Mr. Figueroa that he was tired of renters and that 
he wanted to sell the property. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 6). Mr. 
Figueroa indicated that maybe they could work out a deal and 
asked how much Mr. Armijo wanted as a "down" payment. (tr. 
4/12/97 p. 7). Mr. Armijo indicated that all he wanted was what 
he had put into "cleaning" the rental property which was about 
$3,800 and that if the Figueroas decided to buy the house, they 
could take over the payments, (tr. 4/12/97 p. 21). 
On August 25, 1987, Mr. Figueroa indicated to the Salt Lake 
City Airport Authority that he had made an offer to purchase a 
home under a contract. The Airport Authority then scheduled a 
meeting for September 1, 1987 to finalize the transaction. On 
September 1, 1987, Mr. Armijo, Mr. Figueroa and Mrs. Figueroa met 
with the Airport Authority. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 59). Mr. Figueroa 
indicates that at this meeting, the Airport Authority was told 
that they were purchasing the property under contract from the 
Armijos. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 59). While this was confirmed by Mrs. 
Figueroa (Tr. 4/12/97, p.76), Mr. Armijo indicates that although 
he attended this meeting, no one spoke with him and that he had 
no idea as to why he went with the Figueroas to meet with the 
Airport Authorities. (Tr. 4/12/97 p. 19). The Airport Authority 
was apparently sufficiently satisfied that the Figueroas were 
purchasing the property under contract from the Armijos in that 
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they subsequently issued a check voucher in the amount of $4,500 
to the Figueroas. (Tr. A/12/91, p. 59) A few days later, Mr. 
Figueroa tendered $4,000 to Mr. Armijo and subsequently took 
possession of the property shortly thereafter. (Tr. 4/12/97 p. 
61). Although Mr. Armijo indicated that he believed that he had 
a receipt in his records showing the amount of the down received, 
he contends the amount was only $3,000 and was simply a security 
deposit/cleaning fee. (Tr. 4/12/97 p. 21) Mr. Armijo stated that 
Mr. Figueroa asked if he could have one year to build up his 
credit in order to obtain a loan to pay the balance owing. (Tr. 
4/12/97 p. 8, 21). The Armijos agreed. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 8). 
During this period of negotiation as to the purchase agreement, 
it was agreed by the parties that because the Figueroas were 
purchasing the property, the Figueroas would also be responsible 
for paying the taxes and insurance on the property, (tr. 4/12/97 
p. 13, 27, 62, 77). 
Under the terms of the agreement, the Figueroas, after 
having taken possession of the property on October 1, 1987, 
commenced paying to the Armijos a monthly payment of $306.44. 
(tr. 4/12/97 p. 65, 12) . This amount was based on the 
amortization schedule provided to the Figueroas by the Armijos. 
(Def. Exhibit No. 1) The Figueroas continued to pay this amount 
until December 31, 1992.(Tr. 4/22/97, p. 5). On January 1, 1993 
the amount of the monthly payment was increased to $350.00, 
($3 06.44 for the mortgage payment and $43.56 to be held by the 
Armijos for payment of annual property taxes and insurance). (Tr. 
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A/22/91, p. 5). This increase was directly contributed to 
preclude future problems surrounding delinquent property taxes. 
The Figueroas claim that before taking possession of the 
property, they were required to paid $500 to the Armijos for 
property taxes due for 1986. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 62, 63). This was 
paid in cash to the Armijos. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 74) The Armijos 
argue that they were never delinquent in payment of the property 
taxes until after the Figueroas took possession. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 
25) Evidence however shows that on October 7, 1987, the Armijos 
were issued a redemption certificate after payment of $478.55 was 
tendered to the Salt Lake County Treasurer. This redemption 
amount is also close to what the Figueroas claimed they paid 
right after they acquired possession of the property. It is 
evident that property taxes for 1987 also became delinquent. 
When notified that the property was to be sold for these 
delinquent taxes, Mr. Armijo and the Figueroas appeared at the 
Salt Lake County Treasure's office to save the property from tax 
sell. (tr. 4/12/97, P. 27). Sufficient details were given to the 
clerk to reflect that the Figueroas were purchasing under 
contract the property and that the property tax notices should 
continue to be mailed to the Armijos but in care of the 
Figueroas. The record shows that this was accomplished. (Tr. 
4/12/97, p. 64) The Armijos do not dispute that the Figueroas 
paid the property taxes but argue that this requirement was 
agreed upon because the Armijos were letting the Figueroas make a 
smaller rent payment and that this was the same option given to 
other prior tenants. (Tr. 4/12/97, p.12) While no facts were 
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ascertained at the hearing to discern the exact method in which 
the Figueroas were notified as to the amount of the annual tax 
assessments or their due dates for the years of 1987 through 
1992, starting January 1, 1993, if the notices of annual property 
tax and insurance premiums to be paid were greater than the 
amount of the monies held for the benefit of the Defendants, the 
Plaintiffs notified the Defendants as to the difference with the 
Defendants paying directly to the Plaintiffs said difference. 
This method of paying taxes and insurance was testified to by 
Defendant William Figxieroa (Tr. 4/12/97, p.62 ) and collaborated 
by Plaintiff John Armijo (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 44). 
On September 30, 1996, the Plaintiffs gave notice to the 
Defendants that because of an increase in taxes and insurance, 
the rent would now be increased to $450.00 per month which such 
increase becoming effective on November 1, 1996. (Tr. 4/12/97, 
p.36).Testimony elicited at the hearing reflects that this is a 
direct contradiction to the statements made by both Plaintiffs. 
Extract of testimony by Plaintiff John Armijo, answering: 
Q. And then you — is it correct that you contacted me to 
serve them with an eviction notice for nonpayment of 
rent? 
A. Yeah. We passed by the house, me and my wife, and it 
was literally run down. And we were afraid that the 
board of health would close it down. So we decided, 
well, we'd up the rent and we have to, we'll fix it 
that way. We paint it and stuff like that." (Tr. 
4/12/97 p. 12) 
Extract of testimony by Plaintiff Andrea Armijo, answering: 
Q. Okay. 
A. No. We just figured they were renting and, you know, 
as long as they just kept making their rent payments 
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and stuff. And then when we found out how run down it 
was, I told my husband, "We've got to do something 
about it, you know, it's really in need of painting and 
stuff like that," (Tr. 4/12/97, p.52) 
It was testified to that from January 1, 1993 until October 31, 
1996, the Defendants contributed to the Plaintiffs the $43.56 per 
month for both property taxes and insurance. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 
44). Defendants returned to the terms of the original agreement 
and tendered to the Plaintiffs the monthly mortgage payment of 
$306.44. (Tr. 4/12/97 p. 12). 
In October of 1996, the Defendants submitted a letter to the 
Plaintiffs asserting that they were not "tenants" and any 
increase in the monthly payment violated the original agreement. 
(Tr., 4/12/97 pp. 30-33). If the property taxes and insurance 
had increased as claimed by the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs would 
simply notify the Defendants as to the amount outstanding after 
the monies held by the Plaintiffs had been applied to the amount 
owing and the Defendants would tender the difference. 
In November 1996 the Plaintiffs served upon the Defendants a 
3-Day Notice to Pay or Quit and a Notice of Termination of Month-
to-Month Tenancy. (Tr. 4/12/97, p.35). Shortly thereafter the 
both parties entered into a period of settlement negotiations. 
(Tr. 4/12/97, p. ) Under the terms being discussed during this 
negotiation period, the Defendants were permitted attempt to 
qualify for loan to pay the balance owing on the mortgage. A 
draft settlement was submitted by the Plaintiffs to the 
Defendants to clarify the Plaintiffs possession. At the same 
time the negotiations were going on, Defendant William Figueroa 
was unemployed for a period of about a week. This change of jobs 
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impacted his ability to qualify for financing. These facts were 
stipulated to by both parties at the hearing. (Tr. 4/12/97, pp. 
40-41) 
When Plaintiffs heard nothing as to their settlement 
negotiations, they served a new 3-Day Notice to Pay or Quit and a 
Notice of Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy upon the 
Defendants as well as an Eviction Complaint. (Tr. 4/12/97 p. 41) 
Shortly thereafter the Plaintiffs filed a possession bond 
with the court on April 3, 1997 and subsequently served notice of 
this possession bond on April 4, 1997 upon the Defendants by 
mail. The Defendants filed an objection to the manner in which 
this notice was served on April 9, 1997 and on April 10, 1997, 
requested a hearing. At the hearing, the trial court elected to 
hear testimony as to whether the home was "rental property" or 
not (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 3) and never addressed Defendants' objection 
to the manner in which the notice of this possession bond was 
given. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Plaintiffs are attempting to unilaterally convert a 
contract for sale of land into a rental agreement and thus hold 
the Defendants in breach of a non-existence lease agreement for 
unpaid rent. The Defendants were offered an option to purchase 
real property held by the Plaintiffs under an oral agreement. The 
Defendants exercised their "option to purchase" and have been in 
exclusive possession of this real property since October 1, 1987. 
Defendants submit that pursuant to the terms of this agreement, 
they are "purchasers" and not "tenants" and that the trial court 
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erred in permitting the Plaintiffs to proceed with a unlawful 
detainer action based on unpaid rent. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF 
ORAL CONTRACT TO PURCHASE AN INTEREST IN LAND 
A, The Trial Court's Conclusions 
The trial court, in its conclusions, found that the 
Defendants were not purchaser the subject property from the 
Plaintiffs and that there was no such verbal agreement with the 
Plaintiffs. It then concluded that if a verbal agreement had 
existed, it was barred by the statute of frauds and that the 
Defendants had not met the requirements under the doctrine of 
part performance. The trial court then concluded that at most, 
the Defendants had a rental agreement with the Plaintiffs and a 
one year option to purchase the real property. The trial court 
concluded that the Defendants had failed to exercise their option 
to purchase the property in the required time period. The trial 
court then concluded that the Defendant's right to possession was 
terminated as well as any verbal rental agreement as of March 15, 
1997. 
Excepting the responsibility to marshal the evidence in 
support of such conclusions, the Defendants could not find any 
evidence which supports the trial court's conclusions. Such 
conclusions by the trial court were clearly erroneous. The 
Defendants submit the following points to support their 
contention that the trial court's conclusions are erroneous. 
B. Evidentiary Requirements to Show Existence of Oral Contract 
to Purchase an Interest in Land. 
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The evidentiary requirements to show existence of an oral 
contract to purchase an interest in land is well established in 
Utah. The Utah Supreme Court has held that certain conditions 
must exist before an oral contract for the sale of an interest in 
land can be enforced. First, in order to have an oral contract, 
its terms must be clear, definite, mutually understood and 
established by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony or other 
evidence of the same quality. Second, there must be acts of part 
performance sufficient to take the contract out of the statute of 
frauds. The courts hold that under the doctrine of part 
performance, part performance is established by acts of (1) 
substantial or valuable or beneficial improvements; (2) the 
giving of valuable consideration; (3) actual, open, definite 
possession with the consent of the owner; and (4) acts relied 
upon by the purchaser must be referable to the contract itself. 
Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P. 2d 611 (Utah 1975) 
The Utah Supreme Court holds that the evidentiary burden is 
upon the party asserting the existence of the oral contract and 
that such party has to establish the existence of the oral 
contract by clear, convincing and definite evidence as well as 
showing that acts of part performance done were pursuant to this 
oral contract with such acts being clear, definite and referable 
exclusively to the oral contract. Ryan v. Earl, 618 P. 2d 54 
(Utah 1980). 
The Defendants assert that the essential terms of the verbal 
agreement between the parties consisted of only three terms which 
both parties agreed upon. These terms consisted of (1) the 
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amount of the "down" payment; (2) the purchase price of the real 
property itself; and (3) the party which would be responsible for 
the payment of the taxes and insurance on the property. 
C. Meeting with Salt Lake City Airport Authority as Other 
Supporting Evidence of Existence of Oral Contract to Sale. 
On September 1, 1987 a meeting occurred with the Defendants, 
Mr. Armijo and the Salt Lake City Airport Authorities. This fact 
is not in dispute in that testimony by the parties concerned 
reflect that this meeting took place. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 7, 19-20, 
58-59, & 76) . At this meeting, the Figueroas testified to the 
fact that Mr. Armijo told the Airport Authority that the 
Figueroas were purchasing the home and that he would be holding 
the contract. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 7, 19-20, 58-59, & 76). Mr. 
Armijo contends that no one from the Airport Authority spoke with 
him and that he did not even know why he was there. (Tr. 
4/12/97, p. 19). Prior to issuance of this check the Airport 
Authority is required to inspect the replacement dwelling and to 
certify that it meets the "decent, safe and sanitary" 
requirements of the Relocation Act. U.C.A. § 57-12-7(1) (1953). 
Whether this was accomplished or not is unknown due to the 
limited time for discovery. It is known however, that the Salt 
Lake City Airport Authority subsequently issued a check in the 
amount of $4,500 to Mr. Figueroa on September 3, 1987. (Def. 
Exhibit 6). 
Based on the amount that the check was issued for, the Salt 
Lake City Airport Authority was sufficiently satisfied after this 
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meeting that any check it issued was to be used to purchase a 
replacement dwelling, 
D. Testimony by Mr. Armijo as Evidence in Support of the 
Existence of Oral Contract to Sale. 
Mr. Armijo, when asked to tell exactly what the purchase 
agreement was that he had with the Figueroas, testified that the 
purchase agreement between him and the Defendants consisted of 
receiving a down payment equal to "what I put into the house, and 
then you guys — "If you guys decide to buy it, take over the 
payments" (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 21). This testimony corresponds 
similarly with earlier testimony when Mr. Armijo was describing a 
conversation between himself and Mr. Figueroa after Mr. Figueroa 
asked how much "down" and he stated: "Look, all I want is a 
cleaning charge ... If you decide to buy it, that will go down on 
the payment." (Tr. 4/12/97, p.7). Mrs. Figueroa confirmed this 
agreement when she testified that her "understanding was we gave 
them the $4,000 down and we would just take over the house 
payment and pay the taxes and the insurance, which we have been 
doing." (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 77). 
These terms are clear, mutually understood, and a positive 
agreement of both parties as to the terms of the contract. 
Additional terms between the parties were to clarify and not 
designed to modify the initial agreement, i.e., responsibility 
for the payment of annual taxes and insurance which was 
subsequently modified to a monthly installment tendered to the 
Armijos to preclude delinquent taxes. 
E. Payment of "Down" by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs was 
Acceptance of Plaintiffs' Offer to Sell 
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Mr. Armijo testified to receiving the "down" payment from 
the Defendants a few days after the parties met with the Airport 
Authorities. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 7 & 21). The Plaintiffs contend 
that this "down" was only a security deposit and a cleaning fee 
tendered by the Defendants until the Defendants decided to 
purchase the property at which time it would be applied to the 
balance of the underlying mortgage. (Tr. 4/12/97, pp. 14-15). 
Plaintiffs1 contention that Defendants were renting the real 
property under an option to purchase to be exercised within the 
first year of possession is contrary to the terms testified to by 
Mr. Armijo. 
The Defendants exercised their option to purchase by 
tendering to the Plaintiffs the required "down" based on the 
terms of the purchase agreement with Defendants exercised their 
option in accordance with its terms. See Coombs v. Ouzounian, 
465 P.2d 356, 357 (1970) (holding that tender of payment is 
necessary where option requires payment for exercise). 
F. The Purchase Price of the Real Property is Clear and 
Definite 
Testimony by the Plaintiffs reflects that the purchase price 
of the real property was to be the amount owing at the time the 
Defendants took possession of the property. Mr. Armijo confirmed 
that if "Mr. Figueroa had purchased the property, then the 
purchase price was going to be the balance on your underlying 
mortgage, plus the $3,000 that he had paid as a deposit for 
cleaning and damage ..." (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 15) He further 
testified that his intent was "... if you could sell the 
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property, you'd have someone come in and pay you enough to 
basically take out that mortgage and get [him] , basically out of 
the picture." (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 16). Plaintiff Andrea Armijo 
confirmed the purchase price as being "[w]hatever we owed on it." 
(Tr. 4/12/97, p. 54). 
G. Responsibility for Payment of Property Taxes and Insurance 
Testimony by Mrs. Figueroa reflects that from time of 
possession until January of 1993, the Defendants were responsible 
for paying the taxes. She further testified that from January 
1993 until November of 1996, the Defendants tendered $350 a month 
to the Plaintiffs with an agreement that $43.56 each month would 
be put aside to pay property taxes and insurance. (Tr. 4/12/97, 
p. 79 & Tr. 4/22/97, pp. 3-6) Testimony by Mr. Figueroa reflects 
that Mr. Armijo told him that Mr. Figueroa was to "pay all your 
taxes and pay the insurance." (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 62). In addition 
Mr. Figueroa testified that after having experienced difficulty 
in coming up with the money to pay the taxes and insurance, he 
talked to Mr. Armijo and they both agreed that the Figueroas 
would start paying $350 per month with Mr. Armijo taking $40 some 
odd dollars out and putting into a separate account to pay the 
year-end taxes and insurance. (Tr. 4/12/97, p. 62) . Mr. Armijo 
testified to this separate account for the payment of taxes. 
(Tr. 4/12/97, p. 44). Payment of taxes by the Figueroas for the 
years 1987 through 1992 was introduced in evidence as Defendants 
Exhibit 12. 
POINT II - The Oral Agreement to Purchase Real Property is 
Enforceable under the Statute of Frauds and Through 
Part Performance Thereof, Removed from the Statute of 
Frauds. 
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Under the statute of frauds, the purpose is well established 
that it is designed to protect and preserve property interests 
and to avoid real property disputes. 
Our statute of frauds provides that: 
"Every contract for the ... sale, of any lands, or interest 
in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the ... sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing." S25-5-3, U.C.A. (1953) as 
amended. 
A companion statute to the preceding statute provides that: 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of agreements in case of part performance 
thereof." §25-5-8, U.C.A. (1953) as amended. 
In order to have an enforceable oral contract for the sale 
of an interest in land, the terms of the contract must be clear, 
definite, mutually understood and established by clear, 
unequivocal and definite testimony or other evidence of the same 
quality. In addition to the actual existence of an oral 
agreement, there must be acts of part performance sufficient to 
remove the agreement out of the statute of frauds. Under the 
doctrine of part performance, there must be acts of (1) 
substantial or valuable or beneficial improvements; (2) the 
giving of valuable consideration; (3) actual, open, definite 
possession with the consent of the owner; and (4) acts relied 
upon by the purchaser must be referable to the contract itself. 
Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah 
1975). 
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Both testimony and other evidence introduced at the hearing 
supports the existence of an oral agreement enforceable under the 
statute of frauds. By his own testimony, Mr. Armijo established 
what the terms of the oral agreement are. These terms, while 
being clear, definite and mutually understood by the Figueroas as 
they so testified, were simply that all Mr. Armijo wanted was a 
down payment equal to what he had just put in the home with the 
Figueroas to "assume" the balance of the mortgage payments then 
owing at the time of possession. Other evidence supporting a 
oral agreement was testimony elicited from the Figueroas as well 
as Mr. Armijo as to their meeting with the Salt Lake City Airport 
Authority. Based on this meeting and the representation of the 
parties thereat as to the existence of an offer to sell, the Salt 
Lake City Airport Authority issued a check to Mr. Figueroa for a 
replacement dwelling. This check and the amount thereon, 
represents that sufficient information was gleaned from Mr. 
Armijo by the Airport Authority to believe that the Figueroas 
were purchasing a replacement dwelling from Mr. Armijo. 
Addressing the second criterion under the Holmgren test 
relating to part performance, no evidence was given or 
ascertained as to any substantial or valuable or beneficial 
improvements on the part of the Defendants. Through affidavits 
submitted on behalf of the Defendants, the trial court was 
capable of being appraised of the premises therein to be 
adequately informed as to the improvements made by the Defendants 
to the real property. While these improvements were estimated to 
have cost $8,500 and were accomplished over a nine year period, 
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the cost of these improvements is not so great as to preclude 
compensation. However, such improvements were not those that 
would have been made by a tenant in the ordinary use of the 
premise, but were instead of a character permanently beneficial 
to the land. Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 56 (Utah 1980). 
Of the second requirement to support part performance, 
dealing with valuable consideration, the Defendants paid directly 
to the Plaintiffs an amount of $4,000 as a "down". 
As to the third requirement, Defendants1 possession of the 
property was open and known to the Plaintiffs with their consent. 
And to the last criteria to establish sufficiency of part 
performance, the substantial or beneficial or valuable 
improvements, the valuable consideration, and the possession of 
the real property are all referable to the contract and this last 
criteria is fully met. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants acquired an interest in the real property in 
question from the Plaintiffs by means of a verbal agreement to 
purchase. This verbal agreement was clear, definite, and 
mutually understood by both parties. Under the statute of frauds 
and the doctrine of part performance, the Defendants made 
substantial improvements to the real property which an ordinary 
tenant would not have done, delivered to the Plaintiffs valuable 
consideration, and had been in exclusive possession of the real 
property after tendering a substantial "down" to the Plaintiffs 
to exercise their option to purchase. It is apparent that the 
term "option to purchase" as used by the Plaintiffs referred to 
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the Defendants acquiring a loan or financing to "assume the 
balance owing on the mortgage by the Plaintiffs. It was not 
until after the Defendants refused to pay the "rent" increase 
that the Plaintiffs asserted this "option to purchase." 
Upon the Defendants exercising the option to purchase in 
September 1987 by delivering to the Plaintiffs a "down" payment 
and subsequent to this, taking possession of the property, the 
relationship of landlord-tenant never existed to permit the 
Plaintiffs to bring an unlawful detainer action based on unpaid 
rent. 
WHEREFORE the Defendants pray for a reversal of the trial 
court's order and judgment and to restore Defendants to the home, 
or in the alternate, to order the trial court to publish new 
findings and conclusions as this Court may deem proper. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2^3 day of October, 1997. 
James D. Garrett, #6091 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
GARRETT & GARRETT 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801) 581-1144 
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